Abstract -This paper aims to research various data mining techniques applied to solve intrusion detection problems. In general, intrusion detection techniques can be divided into two major categories: misuse detection and anomaly detection. Taking into consideration effectiveness of the anomaly detection technique not only against known types of attacks (like misuse detection does by exploiting signature database) but also against new ones, it has become a topical issue in majority of data and computer security researches.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years a vast majority of research activities in the area of anomaly detection have been focused on studying the behaviour of programs and the creation of their profiles based on system call log files. Until now, a simple anomaly detection method based on monitoring system calls initiated by the active and privileged processes is widely used [1] . The profile of normal behaviour is constructed by enumerating all unique, and related fixed length system calls, which are observed in the training data; in turn, previously undetermined sequences are considered abnormal. This approach has been extended by various other methods. It was suggested to utilize data mining approach to study samples of the system calls and construct small set of rules contained in normal data. During the monitoring and detection, the sequences that violate these rules are treated as anomalies [2] . Also Hidden Markov Model (HMM) can be used -a method for modelling and evaluation of invisible events based on system calls [3] . Later, the idea of analyzing patterns of system calls of fixed length has been further developed, by analyzing patterns of system calls, but of variable length [4] . Furthermore, a new method for intrusion detection, based on the method of principal components has been introduced [5] . In addition to those listed above, an algorithm based on the method of K-nearest neighbours is proposed in the paper [6] .
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Profiling the behaviour of the end user is not less important aspect of data protection than the profiling the software activities. This method is effective in detecting internal attacks that constitute one-third of the corporate system security [7] . In information systems based on UNIX or Linux operating system, the sequences of shell commands are easily collectible and analyzable information, thus being the source material for creating profiles of end users. Besides, the collection of such information does not use significant system resources. On the other hand, taking into account the difference between the behaviour of end users, the building of profiles of their activities is a difficult task comparing to building a profile of program behaviour. Hackers can even try adapting their behaviour to fool IDS systems.
III. HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
A particularly powerful method that uses a fixed number of states is a Hidden Markov model, which is widely used in speech recognition, as well as in the simulation of DNA sequences [8] , [9] . The hidden Markov Model (HMM) describes a double stochastic process. HMM states represent some unobservable conditions of the system being modelled. In each state there is a certain probability of creating one of the possible system outputs and a separate probability indicating a possible next state.
Standard HMM has a fixed number of states, so before training the size of the data model has to be chosen. As described in the earlier research works, the only correct way forward is to select a number of states approximately corresponding to the number of unique system calls used by the program [3] . Most of the currently used programs use 40 different system calls; as a consequence, in most cases Hidden Markov Models of the 40 states can be used. The states are completely interconnected, transitions are allowed from any state to any other state. Consequently, probabilities of transition from one state to another and probabilities of occurrence of each system call should be kept. For a program using the system calls and, therefore, the state model, that means approximately values. In most cases, the transition probabilities can be randomly selected and then trained using the Baum-Welch algorithm, as described in [8] . And yet, in some cases, preliminary information is useful when performing initialization. As an example, system calls for print resources can be mentioned. The main difference between various calls for the same resource is the length of the document sent to the printer.
As it has already been mentioned in many researches -HMM training is a very resource-costly process. Calculations for each of the program trace, while performing training, take , where is the length of the system call (see Table IError Testing is more effective in comparison with the above described training. A standard way to check the HMM is to calculate the probability that it will produce data which differ from the original training set. However, simpler methods can also be used, which (unlike the standard method) are not sensitive to the length of the traces of system calls and better suited for use in online mode. "Reading" traces of a system calls one by one requires tracking of the state transition and output that are required from the HMM to produce that system calls. If the constructed HMM is a good model of the program, then the normal traces should require only standard transitions and outputs, while intrusive traces must include one or more system calls that require unusual state transitions and/or symbol outputs.
At any given time , there is a list of currently possible states. Choosing just one more probable state for each system call is not the best method of using the constructed HMM; respectively, tracking of all possible ways should be done. Thresholds are set for the probability of "normal" state transitions. Then, if a system call is encountered in the trace which could only have been produced using below-threshold transitions or outputs, it is flagged as a mismatch.
The time to check each system call depends on the size of the model and size of the current list of valid states. This list tends to be very small, if it consists of only "normal" tracks and, on the other hand, contains all the possible states after the discovery of anomalies.
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION USING AUDIT TRAIL PATTERNS
Below a method used to extract and compare patterns, as well as the metrics used to distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviour [4] is described.
A. Extracting Patterns
Algorithm to build a table of fixed-length patterns is very simple. From the sequence of data passed through the analysis module, all the unique subsequences are retrieved (models of a given length k). This is achieved by using a sliding window of length k for all the input data, followed by writing all occurring subsequences. In this case, the duplicates are ignored. Construction of the pattern table is best illustrated by an example. When and the training set is , this table layout is achieved:
It should be noted that pattern appears only once in the table, although it occurs in two positions, namely the first and last.
B. Pattern Matching
Pattern-matching technique is similar to the patterngeneration technique. The k-length window is moved through the sequence, recorded during the actual operation of the system. Each item is checked for a match, i.e., whether there is a pattern that corresponds to the subsequence in the window.
If the above presented data (pattern table) and simple sequence are taken, for example, three matches -, and two mismatchescan be observed.
C. Metrics
It should be noted that the length of the analyzed sequences cannot be a source of information about a possible invasion. All events must be analyzed upon arrival to the analysis-unit, besides there is no need to wait until all the events of one particular process are available for analysis before starting to check for signs of intrusion. That would be problematic, for example, in cases of continuously running processes. In [11] , three measures are used to distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviour. However, only the measure described below is independent of the sequence length. Let and be two sequences of length . The expression designates the character at position . The difference between and is defined as ,
where (3) During pattern matching, for each subsequence the minimum distance between and the entries in the pattern table is determined:
To detect an attack, at least one of the subsequences generated by the very attack, should be classified as an anomaly. In terms of the above measure, there is at least one subsequence for which (5) It is assumed that the higher the value , the greater the likelihood that the sequence is actually generated by the invasion. In practice, the maximum observed value is used as an example of the invasion, because it represents a strong signal of the anomalous behaviour of the system. Anomaly signal, , is defined as:
Ideally, the value , which is higher than 0 can be considered a sign of invasion. However, as shown by experimental results, full compliance cannot always be achieved [11] . Thus, the threshold is defined so that only the sequences with above this threshold are considered suspicious.
V. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOURS
Instead of analyzing the local ordering of system calls, data on the frequency of system calls can be used to characterize program behaviour. Using the metaphor of text processing, each system call is treated as a "word" in a long document, and a set of system calls generated by each process is seen as a "document". This analogy enables us to use the full range of well-developed methods of text processing [10] for the problem of intrusion detection. One such method is the method of K-nearest neighbour classification [6] .
By analogy with text categorization, each process initially appears as a vector where each entry is a system call during the process. Ranking techniques, such as the frequency weighting and , are used to determine the values of vector elements. To classify a new process as normal or intrusive, kNN classifier computes the similarity between the new process and each instance of training data, and uses the class labels of K closest neighbours to define the class of the new process. This approach contributes to the underlying assumption that the processes belonging to one class will be collected in a single cluster in the vector space. Some significant advantages of using text classification techniques to detect intrusions should be identified. First, the size of system calls dictionary is very limited. In a widely used DARPA data set, less than 100 different system calls are presented, while a typical text classification problem can handle over 15,000 unique words [10] . Thus, the dimension of the process vector is greatly reduced, and there is no need to use dimensionality reduction methods. Secondly, the problem of intrusion detection can be considered a binary classification problem, which makes adapting text categorization methods very simple.
First for training purposes intrusion detection is implemented, based solely on the normal behaviour of the program. In order to ensure processing of all possible normal processes of the program, a large amount of training data must be used. After processing the training data of normal behaviour, the method of text categorization can easily be adapted to detect anomalies. It is necessary to scan the audit test data to extract all system call sequences for each new process. Afterwards, it is necessary to calculate the similarity of the new process and every process from a training set of data. If at least in one case the value of similarity equals 1, that means that the new process system call and a system call of a process from training data sets match perfectly, then this new process can be immediately classified as "normal". Otherwise, ratings of calculated similarities are sorted, and k-nearest neighbours are selected to determine the "normality" of the new process.
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VI. PRINCIPLE COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Assuming that the observed dataset is divided into blocks either by a fixed length (for example, divided consecutively by 100 in the command data) or by an appointed scheme (for example, separated by processes in the system call data) and there are unique elements in the available dataset, in this case, the analyzed dataset can be represented by vectors, each of which contains observations. Then a matrix can be build, where each element stands for the frequency of -th, individual element occurs in the -th block.
Using the available training set of data vectors , average vector and each mean-adjusted vector can be computed. So as eigenvalue-eigenvector pairs of the sample covariance matrix of vectors [11] , [12] can be calculated. Several eigenvectors , forming the matrix , which can be used to represent the distribution of the initial data, are chosen empirically.
Given a test data vector , it can be projected onto thedimensional subspace according to the rules [13] ( 7) The distance between the test data vector and its projection onto the subspace is simply the distance between the meanadjusted input data vector (8) and (9) If the test data vector is normal (does not contain any signs of intrusion), the vector and its projection will be very similar, and the distance between them is very small and close to zero [14] . Based on this property, a normal program and user behaviour are profiled for anomaly detection. In principle, the following three methods for measuring the distance (or in this case, similarity) between two vectors can be used for comparison of the experimental results -Euclidean distance, Cosine distance and Signal-to-Noise (SNR) measure.
Euclidean distance, Cosine distance and the SNR measure for the anomaly detection purposes can be represented as follows: (10) (11) (12) In the procedure of anomaly detection, , and are considered to be detection indices. If either , is below or is above a predetermined threshold, test data will be classified as normal, otherwise as anomalous.
Using PCA for intrusion detection, good testing results can be achieved. Figure 1 shows the experimental results using squared Euclidean distance measure with the former 200 traces of data for training and other 700 traces for testing. It is observed that abnormal data can be easily distinguished from normal data.
VII. ASSOCIATION RULES
All the above-described data mining methods are widely studied and discussed in many articles and scientific experiments. In turn, a method for association rule construction being one of the most popular approaches among various data mining methods is relatively rarely used in anomaly detection sphere.
Initially, association rule induction method has been proposed to be used for the so-called problem of market basket analysis, which aims to find patterns in behaviour of supermarket consumers. In particular, Boolean associative rules aim to identify sets of products (items) which are often bought together. Discovered rules may, in particular, tell us that people who buy butter and milk will also buy bread.
Construction of association rules is aimed at finding meaningful connections between the elements of a given set of data. Let be a set of products, called elements. Let D be the set of transactions, where each transaction T -is a set of elements of I, where
. 
In other words, the purpose of analysis is to identify the following dependencies: if a certain set of elements of X appears in the transaction, then on the basis of this we can conclude that a different set of Y is also to appear in this transaction. Establishing such relationships enables us to find very simple and intuitive rules.
Association rule mining algorithms are designed to find all the rules of XY, furthermore support and confidence of these rules should be above some certain threshold, called, respectively, the minimum support (minsupport) and the minimum confidence (minconfidence).
Association rule mining problem is divided into two subtasks:
 Mining of all itemsets that satisfy the minsupport threshold. Such itemsets are called frequent.  Generation of rules from the itemsets mined according to the previous point with reliability, meeting the threshold minconfidence. One of the first introduced algorithms to effectively solve this class of problems is the APriori algorithm. The algorithm works according to the above mentioned two stages -the first step is to find frequent itemsets, and the second one -to mine rules. The number of items in a set is called the size of the set, and a set consisting of k elements -k-cell collection.
In the first step of the algorithm, one-element frequent sets are computed. In order to do this, it is necessary to compute a support value for all elements in the data base.
The following steps will consist of two parts: the generation of potentially frequent itemsets (called candidates) and computing of support for candidates.
The above-described algorithm can be represented in the following pseudo-code: The described association rule induction algorithm can be used for two phase (learning and detection phases) intrusion detection system. Taking into account that during the learning phase the system learns and analyzes raw data provided and then, on the basis of these rules, creates a security model that will subsequently be used for a real intrusion detection, it can be concluded that the construction of proper rules of normal behaviour of the system is a key factor for an intrusion detection system.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Such data mining techniques applied to the problem of intrusion detection have been examined, as Hidden Markov models, audit trail pattern extraction, k-nearest neighbour method, principle component analysis and the construction of association rules. All the above mentioned techniques have both advantages and disadvantages regarding the stated task of intrusion detection.
Markov models have a fixed number of states, so, firstly, it is necessary to decide on the size of the data model before learning process starts, and, secondly, taking into account the fact that the states are completely interconnected, transitions are allowed from any state to any other state and, consequently, probabilities of transition from one state to another and probabilities of occurrence of each system call should be kept. For a program using the system calls and, therefore, the state model, that means approximately values.
In case of an audit trail pattern extraction method, it must be emphasized that the anomaly signal, is defined as:
Ideally, the value , which is higher than 0 can be considered a sign of invasion. However, as shown by experimental results, full compliance cannot always be achieved [12] . Thus, the threshold is defined so that only the sequences with above this threshold are considered suspicious.
The k-nearest neighbour data mining technique is one of the most applicable to the solution of the intrusion detection problem, taking into account that this method allows using the full range of well-developed methods of text processing [10] . As mentioned above, the method for association rule induction being one of the most popular approaches among various data mining methods is relatively rarely used in anomaly detection sphere. It is absolutely necessary to mention such important advantages of this algorithm to solve the problem as the simplicity of algorithm usage in transactional databases, as well as the very essence of the construction of association rules -support and confidence of these rules must be above some certain threshold, called, respectively, the minimum support (minsupport) and minimum confidence (minconfidence). Thus, this method shows a good (in this case -low) level of false detection of anomalies.
